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In recent years a body of international norms and standardsfor protecting children affected by armed conflict hasemerged. Of particular importance is the Optional Pro-
tocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (Optional
Protocol), which entered into force on February 12, 2002. The
Optional Protocol sets 18 as the minimum age for compul-
sory military recruitment. It also requires that states mandate
a minimum age, never less than 15, at which they will accept
voluntary military recruits. 
Although the enactment of the Optional Protocol is a laud-
able achievement, it is abundantly clear that child soldiers
continue to be employed at increasingly alarming rates.
One statistic illustrates the depth to which armed conflict con-
tinues to deleteriously affect children: more than 300,000 chil-
dren under 18 are engaged in conflict, serving as combatants
in nearly 75 percent of the conflicts around the globe. While
protracted conflicts ensue from Asia to South America,
potential conflicts loom on the horizon as well. Such conflicts
test the capacity of the Optional Protocol to protect children
in conflict and serve as reminders that the enactment of inter-
national instruments alone has not stopped the aggressive
mobilization of the world’s youngest and most vulnerable
population.
The most effective means of ending this offensive practice
is a multi-faceted approach. Governments, international
agencies, and local actors must continue to pressure armed
forces to stop recruiting and deploying child soldiers. Human
Rights Watch recently noted that several armed opposition
groups in Burma appear to be responding to such pressure.
It also is important to curb the easy availability of small arms
and military aid, both of which facilitate the use of child sol-
diers. Additionally, it is critical to reduce the risk of child
recruitment. Governments should regularize recruitment
procedures and prosecute those who violate rules precluding
underage recruitment. Educating parents and local com-
munities about national and international law strengthens
their capacity for advocacy, protection, and monitoring, thus
potentially minimizing the risk of recruitment. Further, child
soldiers often are products of impoverished and desperate
socio-political environments. Addressing these root causes is
another key component of reducing the risk of recruitment. 
Additionally, demobilization and rehabilitation pro-
gramming is important. The establishment of peace creates
an opportunity for war-torn states to begin directing energy
and resources toward the victims of conflict. Peace agreements
thus ought to include specific measures pertaining to the
demobilization and reintegration of children, including the
creation of jobs for youth and rebuilding schools and local
communities. As the tenable peace in post-conflict Sierra
Leone demonstrates, developing a protective environment for
demobilized child soldiers and laying the groundwork for
reunification is important. Absent meaningful and effective
implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and rein-
tegration programming, post-conflict situations could once
again degenerate into conflict. 
From Impressionable Youth to Ruthless Killer: 
The Phenomenon of the Child Soldier
Across each continent countless states are submerged in
conflict. In armed conflicts from Sierra Leone to Burma to
Colombia, fighting between government forces and non-
state armed groups has led to the destruction of entire com-
munities. Murder, rape, and torture of the local population
are the predominant tactics that government and opposition
groups employ to strike terror and maintain power. The
aggressive recruitment of child soldiers enables such cam-
paigns of terror around the world. Government and rebel
forces abduct and forcibly conscript children, violently quash-
ing their innocence and transforming them into fighters
and sex slaves. 
Abducted and forcibly recruited by armed forces, chil-
dren in armed conflicts suffer two-fold as both witnesses to
atrocities and perpetrators of unspeakable crimes. Many
child soldiers fight on the front lines; others are used as
spies, messengers, and servants. For young girls, recruitment
leads to particularly atrocious suffering. Young girls often are
employed as sexual slaves and are subject to rape, sexual
abuse, and sexual harassment.
Child soldiers are appealing to armed forces for various
reasons, including the fact that children are easy to arm and
control. Children are easy to manipulate because they are
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obedient and unlikely to question orders. As the Coalition to
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers notes, governments and armed
groups use children because they are “easier to condition into
fearless killing and unthinking obedience.” Armed forces
consider children to be useful soldiers because of the ability
to arm children with newly developed lightweight and easy
to fire weapons. Also, armed forces frequently assign children
to a fatally dangerous task because of their size and agility: the
laying and clearing of landmines.
Armed forces employ countless tactics to turn young chil-
dren into murderers. Drugs and alcohol are forced upon chil-
dren to dull their sensitivity to pain. In all too many conflicts,
sheer terror and a desperate struggle to survive lead children
to war. This practice of brutalizing children and transform-
ing them into hardened killers creates a moral and political
dilemma for states in conflict with regimes that employ child
soldiers. Conflict with such regimes requires a state to simul-
taneously condemn the use of child soldiers as a violation of
international law, yet remain aware of the threat they pose. 
International Legal Mechanisms
International Labor Organization Convention 182 Con-
cerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elim-
ination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour was adopted in
June 1999 and was the first international legal instrument to
legally recognize child soldiering as a form of labor. In fact,
the convention deems child soldiering to be one of the worst
forms of child labor. Article 3(a) specifically states that the
worst forms of child labor include “all forms of slavery or prac-
tices similar to slavery, such as . . . forced or compulsory
labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of chil-
dren for use in armed conflict.” Convention 182 is also the
first international treaty to set 18 as the minimum age for mil-
itary participation.
Convention 182 precipitated the development of a body
of international norms and standards for protecting chil-
dren affected by armed conflict. As Secretary-General Kofi
Annan noted during a recent Security Council meeting on
children and armed conflict, on January 23, 2003, there is
growing evidence of an increased international commitment
to the protection of children and child soldiers. Secretary-Gen-
eral Annan emphasized the importance of two landmark
instruments — the Rome Statute of the International Crim-
inal Court (Rome Statute) and the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement
of Children in Armed Conflicts — both of which entered into
force this past year and significantly strengthen existing pro-
tections for children in armed conflict. 
The Rome Statute defines the use of child soldiers under
15 as a war crime. Consistent with this definition, the Inter-
national Criminal Court has jurisdiction over the war crime
of conscripting or enlisting children under 15 into national
armed forces or armed groups and of using children as active
participants in hostilities. Additionally, the Rome Statute
contains an expansive definition of “participation in hostili-
ties.” The statute explains that “use of children in a direct sup-
port function such as acting as bearers to take supplies to the
front line, or activities at the front line itself, would be
included within the terminology.”
The Optional Protocol, which has been signed by over 100
countries and ratified by more than 40, presents perhaps
the most useful tool for combating the employment of chil-
dren in warfare. This landmark instrument represents uni-
versal opposition to the harmful impact of armed conflict on
children. The underlying Convention on the Rights of the
Child (Convention) generally defines a child as any person
under the age of 18, yet sets 15 as the minimum age for mil-
itary recruitment and participation in armed conflict. The
Optional Protocol amends the Convention by making 18
the minimum age for conscription. This change is significant
because it marks a shift in international opinion regarding the
age at which it is acceptable to conscript children. 
The first three articles concern direct participation in
hostilities, compulsory recruitment, and voluntary recruit-
ment, respectively. Article 1 stipulates that states parties “shall
take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their
armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not
take a direct part in hostilities.” Article 2 requires states par-
ties to ensure that persons who are under 18 are not com-
pulsorily recruited into the armed forces. Article 3 has been
lauded as a particularly significant achievement. This provi-
sion that states parties raise the minimum age for the voluntary
recruitment of persons into their armed forces from that set
out in the Convention. The second paragraph of this article
authorizes states parties to determine the minimum age at
which it will permit voluntary recruitment into its armed
forces. Where a state party permits voluntary recruitment
under the age of 18, states must comply with the following
minimum safeguards as set forth in Article 3, paragraph
3(a): (1) recruitment must be genuinely voluntary; (2) recruit-
ment must be conducted with the informed consent of the
person’s parents or legal guardians; (3) recruits must be
fully informed of military duties; and (4) recruits must pro-
vide reliable proof of age prior to acceptance into national
military service. 
The fourth and fifth articles of the Optional Protocol per-
tain to non-state armed groups and establish a framework for
holding non-state armed groups accountable for child sol-
diering. Article 4 explicitly states that “armed groups that are
distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under
any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under
the age of 18 years.” The Optional Protocol further provides
that application of its principles is not contingent on the exis-
tence of an armed conflict, rendering questions as to whether
a situation amounts to an armed conflict irrelevant. Perhaps
most importantly, the Optional Protocol requires all states par-
ties to endeavor to prevent the recruitment and use of chil-
dren under 18, rather than limiting this obligation to parties
involved in a particular conflict.
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The Optional Protocol also addresses post-conflict issues,
including demobilization of child soldiers. Article 6 provides
that persons “recruited or used in hostilities” are to be demo-
bilized and accorded “all appropriate assistance for their
physical and psychological recovery and their social reinte-
gration.” Notably, the language makes clear that children vol-
untarily or forcibly recruited into armed groups, as well as non-
state forces, are to be included in demobilization and
reintegration efforts.
Assessing the Optional Protocol  
During the Optional Protocol’s brief existence it has been
both lauded and criticized. As Casey Kelson, coordinator of
the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, recently
remarked, “This first anniversary of the Optional Protocol
should not be a celebration but a time to call upon other coun-
tries to join the international community in condemning
this appalling practice.” 
In an article entitled, “Children in Conflict: Assessing the
Optional Protocol,” Center for Defense Information senior
analyst Rachel Stohl articulated five strengths of the Optional
Protocol: (1) it establishes an international standard for the
employment of children in conflict; (2) it codifies a legal norm
by which states can be held accountable; (3) it sets a minimum
age requirement that makes it more difficult for govern-
ments and non-state actors to fabri-
cate the ages of children employed in
armed conflict; (4) it encourages
states to implement existing national
laws and policies or enact domestic
standards that will reflect the stan-
dards enunciated in the statute; and
(5) it raises public awareness regard-
ing the use of child soldiers.
The Optional Protocol is not, how-
ever, flawless. As Stohl concedes, “The
Optional Protocol is a compromise.”
In particular, its effectiveness suffers
from vagueness. For instance, Arti-
cle 1 stipulates that states “shall take all feasible measures to
ensure that members of their armed forces who have not
attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hos-
tilities.” The deliberate vagueness of this provision enables
states to determine what constitutes “all feasible measures” and
define “direct part in hostilities.” By setting the standards by
which they are judged, states may easily escape the scrutiny
of the international community. The Optional Protocol also
breaks with standard international norms concerning pro-
tocols. Generally, a country is prohibited from becoming a
party to a protocol unless it ratifies the parent agreement. The
Optional Protocol permits states that have not ratified the Con-
vention, such as the United States, to ratify the Optional
Protocol, in turn undermining the spirit of the Convention.
Although much can be gained by allowing states to commit
themselves to the Optional Protocol even where such states
are unwilling to accept all of the terms of the Convention,
some argue this loophole effectively diminishes the signifi-
cance of the Convention. 
Further, the Optional Protocol is not comprehensive in its
approach to tackling the employment of young children in
armed conflict. For example, the Optional Protocol fails to
adequately address the issue of voluntary recruitment of chil-
dren under 18. Additionally, the Optional Protocol fails to
delineate a means for encouraging adherence on the part of
non-state groups. Non-state groups did not participate in
crafting the content of the statute, potentially rendering it dif-
ficult to persuade their adherence. Finally, there is a glaring
absence of monitoring, verification, and enforcement pro-
visions. The absence of such critical components inevitably
will hinder the Optional Protocol’s implementation.
The United States Congress has conducted its own pre-
liminary assessment of the Optional Protocol. The Congres-
sional Human Rights Caucus of the United States Senate
recently sponsored a briefing on child soldiers. The purpose
of the briefing was to highlight the continuing plight of chil-
dren in armed conflict and address implementation and
enforcement of the Optional Protocol. The briefing focused
on countries that have been submerged in conflict for years,
in some instances even decades, highlighting Burma, Cam-
bodia, and Uganda as the most egregious cases of the use of
child soldiers. As the various speakers at the briefing demon-
strated, the pervasive use of child soldiers continues unabated
in spite of the ratification of the Optional Protocol and
increasingly unified international opposition. 
The Role of the Optional Protocol in Protracted Conflicts:
Burma 
To assess the potential effectiveness of the Optional Pro-
tocol, it is useful to consider it in the context of protracted
conflicts, such as the internal conflict in Burma. Protracted
conflicts like Burma underscore the
shortcomings of the Optional Pro-
tocol. The State Peace and Devel-
opment Council (SPDC), Burma’s
military government, crushed pro-
democracy demonstrations in 1988.
Following this victory over democ-
racy, the military government imme-
diately directed energy toward build-
ing its armed forces, capitalizing on
the nation’s youth. In many
instances, young boys are forced to
choose between imprisonment and
military service. Some children even
voluntarily join opposition groups in hopes of avenging past
abuses by the Burmese army. 
With more than 70,000 boys serving in Tatmadaw Kyi,
the government’s army, Burma is estimated to have the
largest number of child soldiers in the world. Armed oppo-
sition groups in Burma also recruit child soldiers. The United
Wa State Army, the largest armed opposition group, utilizes
approximately 2,000 child soldiers. 
Burma’s use of child soldiers is characterized by excessive
brutalization. Should a child be brave enough to refuse enlist-
ment, that child likely is sent to a local army base or recruit-
ment camp and beaten into submission. Following recruit-
ment, Burmese child soldiers, some as young as 11, are
subject to beatings during training, forced to commit human
rights abuses against civilians, and prohibited from contact-
ing their families. Further, children face severe reprisals if they
attempt escape. 
A primary source of recruits is the Ye Nyunt system, or
“Brave Scouts.” Boys as young as seven engage in military
training at the Ye Nyunt camps and are later transferred to Su
Saun Yay recruit holding camps. All recruits entering the gov-
ernment army first endure brutalization and isolation in the
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Su Saun Yay camps. Young recruits performing training exer-
cises are routinely beaten, sometimes to the point of uncon-
sciousness. The brutalization continues at one of twenty for-
mal military training camps. As with initial recruitment, escape
is severely punished. The most common punishment entails
forcing the entire group of trainees, often numbering more
than two hundred, to line up and beat the escapee. The bru-
talization continues even after deployment as these Burmese
child soldiers are forced to carry out brutal acts. Although some
opposition groups have begun to respond to international pres-
sure by reducing the recruitment and deployment of child sol-
diers, the SPDC and the United Wa State Army continue to
ignore such pressure. In fact, the SPDC adamantly denies
that it has even recruited and deployed children. 
Burma’s use of child soldiers vio-
lates its domestic law as well as its
commitments under the Convention,
which Burma ratified in August 1991.
Notably, Burma has not ratified the
Optional Protocol. Even if Burma
were to ratify the Optional Protocol,
its effectiveness is dubious. Among
the flaws Rachel Stohl highlighted,
the Optional Protocol fails to ade-
quately address voluntary recruitment
of children 18 and under. Thus, the
Optional Protocol would be powerless with respect to the
scores of children that voluntarily join the Burmese govern-
ment army or non-state armed groups. Additionally, the
dearth of monitoring, verification, and implementation
provisions impedes the Optional Protocol’s potential effec-
tiveness, particularly in a situation such as that in Burma
where the key players consistently refute their utilization of
child soldiers.
The Role of the Optional Protocol in New Conflicts: Iraq
The Optional Protocol may potentially play a role in the pro-
tection of children before conflict emerges as illustrated by the
war in Iraq. International attention focuses almost exclusively
on Saddam Hussein’s development of weapons of mass destruc-
tion. With international scrutiny centered on the threat of
chemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein’s regime
deliberately recruits children into its armed forces with
impunity. With the onset of the war with Iraq, the international
community must address the ineluctable fact that war will
almost certainly entail combat with children. The Iran-Iraq War
and the Gulf War are instructive because reports suggest that
children fought among Iraqi forces during both conflicts. 
The Iraqi regime has been training children as young as
ten years old since the mid-1990s. Peter Singer, an analyst with
the Brookings Institution, recently reported that Baghdad is
home to nearly 8,000 child soldiers. As Singer explains, “A
common means for totalitarian regimes to maintain control
is to set their country on a constant war footing and milita-
rize society.” Recruiting and training children, and perhaps
most importantly, indoctrinating their impressionable minds
with extremist ideology, enables Saddam Hussein to consol-
idate his hold over the Iraqi people. These were the tactics
Nazi Germany employed to a frighteningly effective degree.
Comparing Iraqi child soldiers with Hitler Youth, Singer
noted that Iraqi child soldiers could similarly “operate with
unexpected and terrifying audacity.” 
National law and policies perpetuate the mobilization of
Iraq’s children. Article 1 of the Iraqi Constitution states that
“[t]he defence of the homeland is a sacred duty and honour
for citizens.” The 1969 Military Service Act sets the mini-
mum age for compulsory recruitment at eighteen. It is unclear
what the minimum age for voluntary recruitment is; sources
such as the Center for Defense Information indicate it may
be as young as fifteen. In fact, the Revolutionary Command
Council is authorized to determine whom it may conscript dur-
ing wartime.
Supplementing national law and policies that permit tra-
ditional recruiting and conscription, military training schools
and military youth organizations are predominantly respon-
sible for the mobilization of Iraq’s children. A host of mili-
tary training programs and youth organizations were launched
following the Gulf War. For instance, in 1998 the Iraqi gov-
ernment initiated a military-preparedness project designed
to equip all Iraqi citizens between
the ages of 15 and 65 with basic self-
defense and small arms training. The
government also developed military
training camps for children between
12 and 17. These military camps have
trained more than 23,000 children in
the usage of light arms and Ba’ath
ideology, which espouses pan-Ara-
bism, socialism, and resistance to for-
eign interference. Political scientists
have even likened Ba’ath ideology
to European fascism. Additionally, numerous military youth
groups are employed to train Iraq’s youth. The Ashbal Sad-
dam, or Saddam Lion Cubs, with members as young as ten,
is but one organization whose training includes the use of
small arms, hand-to-hand combat, and infantry tactics. The
U.S. State Department’s Human Rights Report on Iraq notes
that families who do not enroll their children in these pro-
grams face sanctions, such as the loss of their food ration cards.
Because sanctions are imposed for failure to enroll, enroll-
ment is not functionally voluntary. The report also noted that
the failure to register children in the Fedyayeen Saddam, or
Saddam’s Martyrs, generally results in the denial of school
examination results. The Fedyayeen Saddam reportedly is
comprised entirely of children, numbering between 18,000
and 40,000 troops. 
The near certainty that Saddam Hussein will deploy chil-
dren makes it incumbent upon the international community
to address the use of child soldiers. Presented with this dis-
turbing reality, the shortcomings of international instru-
ments such as the Optional Protocol are evident. Iraq has nei-
ther signed the instrument nor taken any steps toward
preventing the use of children in armed combat or limiting
their participation in military training programs. In fact, it is
conceivable that Iraq’s utilization of child soldiers will only
increase as the war unfolds. Yet as reported in the Independent,
among other sources, it appears the Pentagon has not explic-
itly prepared for facing child soldiers in combat. Given the
psychological trauma that accompanies military combat with
children, as well as the public relations debacle that inevitably
will ensue, it is shocking that American forces did not address
the issue before troops were deployed. Lacking such pre-
paredness, the United States will find itself in a precarious posi-
tion: the United States must condemn the use of child soldiers
as a violation of international law yet remain vigilant against
the threat they pose. 
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As war with Iraq demonstrates, the usefulness of the
Optional Protocol is undermined when rogue states are at
issue. Iraqi law and policies controvert the standards enu-
merated in the Optional Protocol and conflict with a devel-
oping international consensus opposed to the recruitment and
deployment of children under 18. Because Iraq is not oblig-
ated to abide by the Optional Protocol, a concerted campaign
of international pressure may, therefore, be the most effec-
tive tool for protecting Iraqi children.
Conclusion 
The development of international norms and standards
concerning the involvement of children in armed conflict is
significant. In particular, the widespread acceptance of the
Optional Protocol is cause for optimism. Precarious peace
processes, protracted conflicts, and the threat of new conflicts
nonetheless demand a vigilant and concerted commitment
from the international community. Such conflicts also illus-
trate the shortcomings of the Optional Protocol. Buttressed
by mechanisms for implementing, reporting, and monitor-
ing, as well as a more explicit declaration concerning voluntary
recruitment, the Optional Protocol could be employed more
effectively to protect children affected by armed conflict.
International condemnation of the use of child soldiers war-
rants a strengthened Optional Protocol with a capacity for
comprehensive protection of children from conflict. Yet
given the Optional Protocol’s limitations, ending the
deplorable practice of child soldiers requires a multi-faceted
approach. Such an approach should include application of
internal and international pressure, reduction of the risk of
child recruitment, implementation of demobilization and
rehabilitation programming, and prosecution of those who
recruit and deploy child soldiers. 
* Shara Abraham is a 2002 graduate of the Washington College
of Law and a staff attorney with the Prison Reform Advocacy Center.
** This article was drafted in anticipation of the war in Iraq and
does not take into account the recent events in the region.
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the Inter-American Court every year. It exemplifies the extent
to which human rights abuses occur in the Americas and
evidences the potential for the inter-American system to play
a definitive role in removing the shield of impunity for those
who plan and carry out such abuses. 
A decision in favor of Guatemala would set a precedent that
limits the extent to which the Inter-American Court can
exercise its jurisdiction to evaluate the efficacy of domestic
systems of justice in addressing violations of fundamental
human rights. 
Indeed, the convictions of one of the individuals suspected
of carrying out Myrna’s assassination and one of the three
accused of planning the crime were important triumphs in
Helen Mack’s endeavor to seek justice on her sister’s behalf.
In light of such achievements, the Court could choose to con-
strue strictly the requirement of exhausting domestic remedies
and refuse to find the state in violation of the Convention where
it had made progress in the pursuit of justice.
If the Inter-American Court decides the case in favor of the
petitioners, the decision would add force to the existing
jurisprudence that recognizes the Court’s jurisdiction over
cases pending in domestic fora when such domestic pro-
ceedings have been unreasonably delayed or ineffectively
prosecuted. Specifically, this decision would establish the
precedent that although prosecution and conviction of some
state actors responsible for planning or executing human
rights violations are important steps toward fulfilling a state’s
international legal duties, they are insufficient when others
who shared responsibility for such violations continue to
enjoy impunity. Finally, such a decision would underscore
states’ institutional responsibility for state actors who are
involved, at all levels, in planning or carrying out human rights
violations. 
*David Baluarte is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College
of Law and an articles editor for the Human Rights Brief. Erin
Chlopak is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law. The
authors were part of a student group invited to participate in the hear-
ings by WCL Dean Claudio Grossman, former president of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and Commission delegate
to the Court for Myrna Mack v. Guatemala. This article represents
the opinions of the authors, and not necessarily those of the IACHR
or the OAS.
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